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Background
Copyright ownership of multimedia data is vulnerable to the image processing attacks as 
it can be copied easily without loss of quality with no limitation on the number of cop-
ies, tempered and redistributed illegally without authorization due to the growth of the 
digital multimedia technology tools and omnipresent of the Internet. A good solution 
to this problem is to integrate the security information directly to the content of digital 
data in inseparable and/or undetectable form during its useful lifespan (Petticolas 1999), 
and the digital watermarking is one of such techniques, which embeds the copyright 
information such as the watermark to the original digital data to be protected without 
degrading it in an imperceptible manner for the ownership proof purpose in such a way 
that it is very difficult to detect and remove the information by an unauthorized per-
son. It can be detected or extracted later by the owner to prove his copyright in the case 
of legal dispute (Hartung and Kutter 1999). Copyright protection of the digital data is 
defined as the process of proving the intellectual property right to a court of law against 
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unauthorized reproduction, processing, transformation or broadcasting of digital data 
(Ruanaidh and Pun 1998). For copyright-related applications, the watermarked digital 
data is expected to be robust to various kinds of geometrical and removal attacks (Cox 
and Miller 2002).
Classification of the copyright protection of digital document may be based on types of 
data to be watermarked (text, image, audio or video), working domain being used (spa-
tial or transform), information (blind, semi-blind or non-blind), human perception (visi-
ble or invisible), application (source based or destination based), public share (extraction 
or detection) etc. (Hwang 2000). Some researchers have proposed detection based on 
the visual cryptography (VC) that does not alter the original image in order to preserve 
the visual quality of the image, but generates two shares known as the ownership share 
and the identification share. The ownership share is generated from the original copy-
righted document and registered to a certified authority (CA). The identification share 
is generated from the suspected document. Possessing either one of the shares can not 
reveal any information related to the copyright, but stacking of two printed shares on 
transparency sheets conveys meaningful details about the copyright information (Chang 
et  al. 2002; Hsu and Hou 2005; Singh 2009). Visual cryptography based approach has 
attracted for watermarking of sensitive images such as medical images, where alterna-
tion of the pixel values is not permitted (Benyoussef et al. 2015).
Hwang proposed a robust and blind copyright protection scheme based on the visual 
cryptography that generates shares comparing the most significant bits (MSB) of the pix-
els in the image with the global mean intensity of the image (Hwang 2000). The probabil-
ity of false alarm is high in his method. MSB based VC method does not work effectively 
if the histogram of the grey-level image is either left-skewed or right-skewed (Hassan 
and Khalili 2005). To overcome this drawback, a blind and robust watermarking scheme 
for copyright protection of the image in spatial domain using visual cryptography is pro-
posed (Hsu and Hou 2005). It generates the ownership share based on the binary secret 
message bit, global mean intensity of the image and mean of the neighbouring pixel val-
ues of a randomly selected pixels in the image. Their method is robust to many attacks, 
however it is weak to cropping attack. A slightly different approach to the above two 
methods is the one that uses the randomly selected pixel value of the image to compare 
with the global mean intensity for generation of shares (Singh 2009). A robust and blind 
copyright protection scheme based on the visual cryptography is proposed that gener-
ates shares from the product of the normal-distribution random bit and the difference 
between the low and middle level wavelet sub-bands (Lou et al. 2007). Their method is 
robust to many attacks, but it was proved that the security of their method depends on 
the random bit key, but not on the product as the difference between the low wavelet 
sub-band and the middle wavelet sub-band is always positive (Chen et al. 2009). Abusitta 
proposed a copyright protection scheme of the image based on the relationship between 
randomly selected pixels and their 8-neighbours’ pixel and the visual cryptography 
(Abusitta 2012). His method is an extension of Hwang’s method (Hwang 2000).
A robust and blind watermarking scheme based on visual cryptography is pro-
posed that generates shares comparing the dc coefficient of the discrete cosine trans-
form (DCT) of the block of size 8 ×  8 of the image with the mean dc coefficients of 
blocks from all selected block (Rawat and Raman 2012). Their method is robust to many 
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attacks, but is weak to rotation, cropping, impulse noise, Gaussian noise and sharpen-
ing attacks. Jin and Kim proposed an image watermarking scheme based on the DCT 
and the discrete fractional random transform using the visual cryptography (Jin and Kim 
2012). A robust and blind watermarking scheme for copyright protection based on the 
visual cryptography and the singular values of singular value decomposition (SVD) of 
the image is proposed that generates shares comparing the mean of the largest singular 
values from each block in the image with the largest singular value of the selected block 
(Wang and Chen 2007). The methods mentioned above are robust to many attacks, but 
it is possible to reveal the secret message using the unauthorized images. Hossaini et al. 
proposed a robust and blind copyright protection scheme based on the visual cryptog-
raphy and the steerable pyramid (Hossaini et al. 2016). Their method is robust against 
against different types of attacks.
A robust watermarking scheme is proposed that embeds the principal component of 
the watermark of the shuffled SVD (SSVD) of the watermark into the largest singular 
value of the image block of the host image (Guo and Prasetyo 2014). Right orthogonal 
matrix is kept as the key for the extraction. False alarm of their method is less. It was 
reported that the visual quality of the reconstructed image using the SSVD is better than 
one that uses the SVD.
Motivated by the above discussion, a robust and blind copyright protection algorithm 
based on the SSVD and VC in the DWT domain is proposed. It decomposes the image 
into low and high frequency sub-bands and shuffling of pixels is done to the low fre-
quency sub-band. It is then followed by dividing it into similar blocks. Shares are gen-
erated based on the difference between one of the elements in the first column of the 
left orthogonal matrix and its corresponding element in the right orthogonal matrix of 
the SVD of the blocks in the low frequency sub-band of the image. The experimental 
results show that the proposed copyright scheme based on the SSVD and the VC is very 
effective.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. ‘Preliminaries’ section gives brief prelimi-
naries about the cat map transform, discrete wavelet transform, shuffled singular value 
decomposition and visual cryptography. ‘Restoration’ section describes the restoration 
scheme to restore against the rotation, impulse noise and Gaussian noise attacks. ‘Pro-
posed method’ section describes the proposed method. ‘Experimental results’ section 
gives the experimental results, followed by ‘Conclusions’ in the last section.
Preliminaries
This section gives a brief overview of the cat map for image pixel shuffling, discrete 
wavelet transform, singular value decomposition and visual cryptography.
Cat map
The Arnold cat map is a chaotic bijection of the unit square onto itself, which is used to 
shuffle coordinates (x, y) of the image of size N × N, realizing the effect of image encryp-
tion (Fu et al. 2013). The encryption is very slow if the conventional methods of the cryp-
tography for text documents are used, because the size of an image is comparatively big 
(Wang et al. 2009). The new coordinates (x′, y′) on applying the cat map is given as
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where a and b are the positive integers, known as the control parameters, and serve as 
permutation keys.
The cat map is a periodic process, which returns the original position after P iterations. 
This map is area preserving, because the determinant of the transformation matrix is 1. 
Pixels move with periodicity, and P, a, b and the original image’s side length N are corre-
lated; thus, whenever the values a, b and N change, it generates a completely different cat 
map. For shuffling of non-square image of size M × N, the image is reshaped to a square 
image with side length Ns = ceil
(√
M × N), where ceil(x) returns the value of x to the 
nearest integer greater than or equal to x (Fu et al. 2013). The insufficient Ns2 − M × N 
pixels are padded with pseudo random number either 0 or 1 for binary images and in the 
range 0–255 for other images. Keshavarzian and Aghagolzadeh opine that the cat map 
provides better security due to the increased number of security keys (Keshavarzian and 
Aghagolzadeh 2016)
Discrete wavelet transform
Wavelet is a waveform of limited duration that has an average value of zero, and is used 
a basal function for representing signals (Mallat 1989). It gives a multiresolution scheme 
for image representation using different frequencies at different resolution. DWT divides 
an image of size M1 × M2 into four sub-bands LL, LH ,HL and HH, where LL sub-band 
represents the low frequency of the image and approximation coefficients of DWT, and 
LH ,HL and HH indicate the high frequency of the image and are known as the horizon-
tal, vertical and diagonal coefficients respectively. These four sub-bands are approxima-
tion, horizontal details, vertical details and diagonal details of the image. One of the next 
sub-bands can be further processed to obtain the next scale of wavelet coefficients until 
some final scale is reached.
Singular value decomposition
The singular value decomposition is an important topic in linear algebra to diagonalize 
and decompose a matrix into its eigenvectors and eigenvalues (Ranade et al. 2007; Liu 
and Tan 2002). It has been applied successfully in variety of applications such as data 
compression, signal processing, pattern analysis, regression analysis, image steganogra-
phy, watermarking and noise reduction. From the viewpoint of linear algebra, a digital 
image is a matrix with non-negative elements. SVD of a matrix H ∈ RM×N is defined as
where U ∈ RM×M and V ∈ RN×N are the left and the right orthogonal matrices such 
that UUT = UTU = IM and VVT = VTV = IN, S ∈ RM×N is the diagonal matrix consist-
ing of the singular values in a non-increasing order of magnitude and the superscript T 
denotes transpose operator.
It was reported that the performance of the SSVD is better than that of SVD in the 
reconstructed image quality (Guo and Prasetyo 2014). The SSVD is viewed as a pre-pro-
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The shuffled image H−  of the original image H is then fed into the SVD algorithm. The 
SSVD can be defined as
where S{.} denotes the shuffling operator. The shuffling operator produces an ensemble 
image as a low resolution sample of the image.
There are some advantages to employ SVD method in many applications:
1. The size of the block of the image for the SVD transformation is not fixed.
2. The singular value (SV) of the SVD represents the intrinsic algebraic image proper-
ties.
3. A small perturbation in the image does not produce large variation in SVs (Wang and 
Chen 2007).
4. All elements in the first column of the left orthogonal matrix U are of same sign, and 
differences between them are very small (Su et al. 2013).
5. All elements in the first column of the right orthogonal matrix V are of same sign, 
and differences between them are also very small.
6. A small perturbation in the first column element of the either left or right orthogonal 
matrix of SVD does not give a large variation in the image.
7. The difference between the corresponding elements in the first column of left and 
right orthogonal matrices is small.
Such properties can be explored in many copyright protection schemes.
Visual cryptography
Naor and Shamir introduced visual cryptography in their seminal work in which a secret 
message is encrypted in a perfectly secure way in more than one shares such that the 
secret can be decrypted directly by the human visual system (Naor and Shamir 1995). 
Table 1 illustrates how a binary image of size Ns × Ns is divided into two shares of size 
2Ns × 2Ns for a 2-out-of-VC, where each pixel of the secret image is expanded to 2 × 2 
subpixels in the shares. If a pixel is white in the secret message, the corresponding sub-
pixels in both two shares are identical, one of six columns under the white pixel in the 
second and third rows are selected, and the stacked result contains two white subpixels 
and two black subpixels. On the contrary, if a pixel is black in the secret image, the cor-
responding subpixels in the first share are complement to those in the same spatial posi-
tion in the second share, and the stacked result contains four black subpixels. Each block 
of sub-pixels of size 2 × 2 of the two shares is selected randomly, and so the scheme is 
(3)S(H) = H− = USV− T
Table 1 A 2-out-of-2 VC
Pixel White Black
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secure. Possessing of a single share cannot reveal the secret image. Each block of sub-
pixels has six alternative pairs of blocks for both white and black pixel bits.
Restoration scheme against the rotation, impulse noise and Gaussian noise 
attacks
The image is passed through a test for the rotation attack. Once the rotation attack is 
confirmed, the image is then corrected by an image restoration stage. There are two 
types of rotations—loose and crop. The loose type of the rotation produces an output 
image large enough to contain the entire rotated image and the crop type produces an 
output image the same size as the input image, cropping the rotated image to fit.
Figure 1 shows the rotation attack and the restoration of the rotated image using the 
loose type of rotation. The output image after the rotation becomes bigger than the 
input image and padding with 0 is done wherever necessary due to the increase in size. 
The rotation is confirmed as shown in Fig. 1b, if w = w′ and h = h′, where w and w′ are 
displacements in upper left corner toward right and in bottom right corner towards left, 
and h and h′ are displacements in upper left corner toward bottom and in bottom right 
corner towards top, in the regions with complete dark color. The image can be restored 
by using the following equation.
where θ is the angle of rotation and is found as θ = tan−1(wh ), [xy]T are the coordinates 
of the pixel value of the rotated image and 
[
x′y′
]T are coordinates of the pixel value of the 
corrected image.
The image is rotated by angle of −θ in the restoration stage. The size of the corrected 
image before cropping may be big as shown in Fig.  1c as it is padded with zeros all 
around. Cropping by removing the padded portion and resizing are done to obtain the 
final corrected image as shown in Fig. 1d.
A watermarked image may be attacked by the impulse noise and Gaussian noise 
attacks. The performance of the extraction of the watermark can be improved by 














Fig. 1 Procedure for the image restoration for the rotation attack a Original image, b after rotation attack,  
c after restoration and d after cropping and scaling
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Proposed technique
In this section, the proposed copyright protection scheme is proposed. In order to 
enhance the security and improve robustness of the proposed watermarking scheme, 
Arnold cat map is applied to both the image and the watermark (Keshavarzian and Agh-
agolzadeh 2016). The scheme is divided into two phases: ownership share construction 
and identification share construction. During the ownership share construction, one of 
the channels of the color image is used for generation of the share. Padding with the 
pseudo random number in the appropriate range is done prior to the further processing 
if the original host image is not square. The selected channel is decomposed first using 
the DWT into four sub-bands, and the sub-band LL is used for generation of the shares. 
The sub-band LL is least effected by any kind of noise suffered by the image (Rani et al. 
2015). The ownership share is generated from the LL image block of the selected channel 
of the image by comparing one of the elements in the first column of the left orthogo-
nal matrix with the corresponding element in the right orthogonal matrix of the SSVD 
of the image block. The share generations based on SSVD–VC in DWT domain are as 
follows.
Ownership share generation scheme
Let H be a greyscale image or the selected channel of the host color image of size 
M1 × M2, W be the binary watermark of size Ns × Ns, a andb be the control param-
eters of the cat map for shuffling of pixel coordinates of sub-band LL and encrypting 
the watermark, P2 and P1 be the periods of the cat map for the low sub-band LL of the 
image and the watermark respectively, K be a private key for selecting the block Bi, and 
C1 be the codebook as shown in Table 2. Figure 2 shows the schematic diagram of the 
proposed ownership share generation and identification share generation scheme given. 
Steps for the ownership share generation are given below.
O1. Perform 1-level DWT on the image H of size M1 × M2 to obtain four sub-bands 
LL, LH ,HL and HH.
 If the image is not square, padding is done using the pseudo random numbers prior to 
DWT operation to make a square image. Let the size of each sub-band be Ms × Ms.
O2. Apply the cat map on the watermark W of size Ns × Ns N1 times using the control 
parameters a, b and period P1 (whereN1 < P1). Store the encrypted watermark in an 
array.
O3. Generate a list of random numbers { i|such that total number of random numbers = 
Ns × Ns } using pseudo random number generator (PRNG) with the private key K.
O4. Apply the cat map to the sub-band LL, N2 times using the control parameters a, b 
and period P2 (whereN2 < P2). Then divide the encrypted sub-band into several non-
overlapping blocks of size 4 × 4.
Table 2 Codebook C1 for generation of ownership share
Feature | 4,1|<| 4,1| | 4,1|≥| 4,1|
Watermark bit 0 1 0 1
mod( , 6) = 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
Ownership share
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O5. Perform the SVD on a randomly selected block B−
i
 (i denotes the block number) 
generating the following left orthogonal, singular and right orthogonal matrices.
where
and
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Fig. 2 Schematic block diagram of the proposed embedding and extraction scheme
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the codebook C1 of Table 2. mod(i, 6) is used to select one of the alternative sub-pixel 
blocks of the binary bits from the codebook.
O7. Repeat Steps O5–O6 until all the encrypted watermark bits are exhausted. Finally, 
all the ownership share blocks are combined to form the ownership share O.
After the construction of the ownership share, the watermark, the private key K, the 
control parameters a, b, the periods P1, P2 and the numbers of times of shuffling N1, N2 
must be kept secretly by the copyright owner, and the ownership share O should be reg-
istered to a CA for further authentication.
Identification share generation scheme
Steps of the identification share generation are described below.
I1. Perform 1-level DWT on the possibly attacked image H′ of size M1 × M2 to obtain 
four sub-bands LL′, LH ′,HL′ and HH′. If the image is not square, padding is done using 
the pseudo random numbers prior to the DWT operation to make a square image. The 
size of each sub-band is Ms × Ms.
I2. Generate a list of random numbers { i|such that total number of random numbers
Ns × Ns } using pseudo random number generator (PRNG) with the private key K.
I3. Apply the cat map on the sub-band LL′, N2 times using the control parameters a, b 
and period P2 (whereN2 < P2). Then divide the encrypted sub-band into several non-
overlapping blocks of size 4 × 4.
I4. Perform the SVD on a randomly selected block B−′
i
(i denotes the block number) gen-


























































































































Page 10 of 22Devi et al. SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:1091 
I5. Construct the identification share block di based on the feature value (∣∣u′4,1∣∣ < ∣∣v′4,1∣∣ or ∣∣u′4,1∣∣ ≥ ∣∣v′4,1∣∣) and mod(i, 6), as shown in the codebook C2 of Table 3.
I6. Repeat Steps I4–I5 until all the Ns × Ns blocks are used up from the host image H′. 
Finally, all the identification share blocks are combined to form the identification share 
D.
I7. Retrieve the secret image W′ of size 2Ns × 2Ns by stacking the ownership share O 
and the identification share D.
I8. Divide the retrieved secret image W′ into non-overlapping 2  ×  2 blocks sj,k′ 
(1 ≤ j, k ≤ 2).
I9. Perform the reduction process to obtain a reduced secret image W′′ of size Ns × Ns 
by the following rules:
where w is a binary pixel in W′′.
I10. Scramble the watermark W′′ by the cat map (P1  − N1) times using the control 
parameters a and b to obtain the descrambled watermark W′′′.
Experimental results
A set of experiments was performed to verify the robustness of the proposed copy-
right protection algorithm using several images and a binary watermark. Representative 
images are shown in Fig.  3. The images are Lena, Mandrill, Building, Aptus, Goldhill, 
Zelda, Airplane, Barbara, Tiffany, Girl and Brain of size 512 × 512 (Sipi, Imagecompres-
sion, Cipr, Hlevkin). The original binary watermark of size 64 × 64 is shown in Fig. 4a. 
The proposed method (PM) is compared with other popular methods in transform 
domain such as Lou et  al. method (LM) (Lou et  al. 2007), Wang et  al. method (WM) 
(Wang and Chen 2007) and Rawat et  al. method (RM) (Rawat and Raman 2012) that 
use VC. To evaluate the robustness of the proposed method, the proposed method was 
tested using ten different types of attacks: JPEG compression (JP), rotation (RO), median 
filtering (MF), cropping (CR), scaling (SC), impulse noise (IN), blurring (BL), Gaussian 
noise (GN), sharpening (SH) and Gamma correction (GC). The normalized correlation 
(NC) is used to measure the similarity between the original watermark and the revealed 





























Table 3 Codebook C2 for generation of identification share
Feature | 4,1′ | < | 4,1′ | | 4,1′ | ≥ | 4,1′ |
mod( , 6) = 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
Identification share
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where W(m, n) and 
⌢
W (m, n) represent the original secret image and the detected secret 
image respectively, ⊕ denotes the exclusive-or (XOR) operation and Ns × Ns is the size 
of the secret image.
PSNR is used to measure the quality of the attacked image. It is given by
where MSE stands for mean squared error between the original image and the attacked 
image.
Example of cat map encryption
An example of cat map encryption of an image of size 8 × 8 is shown in Fig. 4. Original 
pixel values are shown in Fig. 4a. Values of control parameters a = 3 and b = 2 are con-
sidered in this example. Figure 4b–e are the encrypted pixel values for N2 = 1, 2, 3 and 
4, where N2 is the number of iterations. The period P2 is found to be 4 for these param-
eters. Figure 4d is the encrypted pixel values after 3 iterations and it should be further 
encrypted 1 time to get the decrypted image as shown in Fig. 4e. Periods for different 
combinations of a and b such as 1 & 1, 1 & 2, 1 & 3, 1 & 4, 2 & 1, 2 & 2, 2 & 3, 2 & 4, 3 & 
1, 3 & 2, 3 & 3, 3 & 4, 4 & 1, 4 & 2, 4 & 3 and 4 & 4 are 6, 8, 6,16, 8, 4, 4, 8, 6, 4, 6, 16, 16, 
8, 16 and 8 respectively.
The coordinate (0, 0)′ having the pixel value of 150 will follow the path shown below 
for control parameters a = 3 and b = 2 and image size of 8 × 8 to return to the original 
position. It is shown below.
The original coordinate returns to initial position after 4 iterations. In general, it is 
claimed that as the value of image size increases, the period tends to increase, but it is 




























Fig. 3 Representative images: a Lena, b Mandrill, c Building, d Aptus, e Goldhill, f Zelda, g Airplane, h Bar-
bara, i Tiffany, j Girl and k Brain
Fig. 4 Example of cat map encryption: a Pixel values of an image of size 8 × 8, b Encrypted pixels with 
N2 = 1, c Encrypted pixels with N2 = 2, d Encrypted pixels with N2 = 3 and e Encrypted pixels with N2 = 4
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Assessment of robustness
Table 4 shows the robustness test of PM on different types of attacks such as JP attack 
for quality (Q) from 40 to 90, RO attack for angle (A) of 1°, 2°, 3°, 4°, 5° and 6°, MF 
attack for window size (ws) of 2× 2, 3× 3, 4 × 4, 5× 5, 6× 6 and 7 × 7, CR attack for 
cropping percentage (C) of 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 and 60 %, SC for scaling factor (F) from 
2× 2, 3× 3, 4 × 4, 5× 5, 6× 6 and 7 × 7, IN attack for impulse noise ratio (R) of 0.05, 
0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25 and 0.30, GN attack for zero mean and variance (V) from 0.01 to 
0.10, BL for sigma (ζ) of 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5 and 0.6, SH attack for alpha (α) from 0.1 to 
1.0 and GC attack for gamma (G) from 0.6 to 1.5. It was found that the performance of 
PM is very good for JP, RO, MF, SC, IN, BL, GN, SH and GC attacks on different types of 
images for various ranges and NCs are above 90 % on different values of attacks. The NC 
values are between 70 and 90 % for CR attack. This shows that PM is robust.
Comparison with other methods
Table 5 shows comparison of the proposed method with LM, WM and RM on six differ-
ent images for ten different attacks. The unweighted average (UA) is also shown in the 
table. The table clearly shows the superiority of PM to LM, WM and RM in term of NC 
for JP, RO, MF, SC, IN, BL and GN attacks on different images. LM gives slightly better 
results for CR, SH and GC attacks. Figure 5 is the graphical comparison of PM, LM, WM 
and RM for ten attacks on Lena image. The unweighted average in Table 5 and Figs. 5, 6 
show the superior performance of PM on different images for different parameters.
No attack
Figure 7 shows the various steps to establish the ownership of the copyright. The original 
binary watermark is encrypted by using the cat map and is shown in Fig. 7b. The owner-
ship share is prepared based on the encrypted watermark and the original image and it is 
shown in Fig. 7c. The identification share is prepared from the watermarked image and 
is shown in Fig. 6d. The superimposed image of the ownership share and the identifica-
tion share is shown in Fig. 7e. It is blurred and not recognizable. The reduction superim-
posed image before the decryption is shown in Fig. 7f. It is blurred and not recognizable. 
Figure 7g shows the decrypted watermark, which is exactly similar to the original water-
mark. NC value of the extracted is 100 and PSNR value of the watermarked image is 
infinite for no attack.
JPEG compression attack
Figure 8 shows the quality of the extracted watermark. NC values of LM, WM, RM and 
PM for the JPEG compression attack for Q of 90 are 97.72, 97.09, 97.72 and 99.31 respec-
tively with PSNR value of 39.48  dB on Lena image. NC values are 93.75, 95.50, 96.11 
and 98.04 respectively with PSNR value of 33.93 dB for LM, WM, RM and PM on Lena 
image for Q of 50. It clearly shows the superior performance for the JPEG compression 
attack.
Rotation attack
Figure  8 shows the quality of the extracted watermark. NC values of LM, WM, RM 
and PM for the rotation attack for an angle of an 1° are 79.78, 84.93, 85.49 and 93.82 
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Table 4 Robustness test on different images (in NC)




Q = 40 97.99 98.58 98.36 97.97 99.34 98.63 97.90 98.24 98.26 98.58 98.73
Q = 50 98.04 98.60 98.77 97.90 99.46 98.70 97.97 98.80 98.43 98.63 98.90
Q = 60 98.24 99.02 98.92 98.55 99.24 98.99 98.33 98.73 98.38 98.80 99.07
Q = 70 98.73 99.36 99.09 98.95 99.48 99.09 98.87 98.95 98.65 98.90 99.12
Q = 80 98.97 99.48 99.26 99.09 99.68 99.38 98.99 99.34 99.02 98.95 99.53
Q = 90 99.31 99.87 99.63 99.63 99.73 99.41 99.34 99.60 99.38 99.43 99.63
Rotation
A = 1° 93.82 93.75 94.36 92.50 98.26 96.28 93.31 95.45 92.43 92.55 96.46
A = 2° 93.92 93.62 93.23 90.84 97.87 96.31 93.33 95.50 92.40 92.77 96.43
A = 3° 95.92 95.33 95.58 93.85 98.21 97.80 95.80 96.24 95.67 96.92 96.41
A = 4° 95.80 95.45 95.72 93.55 97.99 97.70 95.77 96.24 95.67 96.99 96.89
A = 5° 95.89 95.50 95.62 93.75 97.97 97.66 95.87 96.02 95.77 97.02 96.85
A = 6
0 96.04 95.45 95.50 93.65 98.26 97.65 95.87 96.31 95.55 97.07 96.45
Median 
filter
ws = 2 × 2 96.11 95.89 95.97 93.72 98.31 98.02 96.36 95.99 96.48 96.43 96.58
ws = 3 × 3 97.90 96.60 97.77 95.89 99.12 98.87 98.73 97.11 97.43 99.14 98.09
ws = 4 × 4 95.62 94.72 95.23 91.72 98.07 97.58 95.89 95.33 95.31 96.14 96.09
ws = 5 × 5 96.06 94.11 95.23 91.35 98.51 98.07 97.24 95.23 96.31 98.02 96.14
ws = 6 × 6 94.72 93.23 93.62 88.91 97.70 97.16 95.14 94.70 94.84 95.60 95.96
ws = 7 × 7 94.84 92.84 93.89 88.96 98.07 97.48 95.77 94.92 95.62 97.14 94.79
Cropping
%C = 10 86.10 93.03 88.84 89.72 93.79 82.95 80.85 89.86 85.98 79.17 93.77
%C = 20 82.61 89.52 83.76 84.44 89.69 79.68 73.33 83.32 79.10 72.63 87.79
%C = 30 81.56 88.20 79.80 80.15 85.72 77.97 71.48 77.09 77.07 70.77 85.62
%C = 40 78.97 80.17 74.68 78.24 80.54 76.09 71.92 72.46 77.26 70.16 81.32
%C = 50 76.09 77.97 72.36 76.24 76.39 75.46 72.11 71.24 73.48 69.67 78.19
%C = 60 73.33 73.99 69.14 75.46 72.80 74.21 72.85 69.50 74.90 69.67 75.48
Scaling
F = 2 × 2 97.85 96.89 97.80 95.99 99.09 98.99 98.41 97.46 97.92 99.16 98.07
F = 3 × 3 96.16 94.60 95.12 91.82 98.19 98.04 96.67 96.04 96.67 97.63 98.31
F = 4 × 4 94.89 93.43 93.79 89.99 97.58 97.14 95.28 95.45 95.89 96.43 95.14
F = 5 × 5 94.16 92.50 93.28 88.74 97.11 97.04 94.14 94.97 95.04 95.92 93.84
F = 6 × 6 93.55 91.99 92.18 87.35 96.58 96.63 93.28 94.60 94.75 95.28 93.26
F = 7 × 7 92.91 91.87 91.11 86.71 96.14 96.28 92.79 94.21 94.33 95.14 92.57
Impulse 
Noise
R = .05 97.72 96.41 97.75 95.55 99.09 98.75 98.51 96.53 97.38 99.07 97.80
R = .10 97.41 96.04 97.60 95.84 98.77 98.92 98.16 96.43 97.14 99.02 97.82
R = .15 97.07 95.89 96.85 94.45 98.87 98.33 97.65 96.38 96.77 98.19 97.16
R = .20 96.43 95.21 96.04 93.67 97.99 97.77 96.82 95.31 95.65 97.14 97.11
R = .25 95.43 94.36 95.23 92.26 98.07 96.75 95.89 94.87 94.84 95.99 96.24
R = .30 93.89 93.96 93.82 91.72 97.11 95.87 94.01 94.01 92.89 93.89 95.48
Blurring
ζ = 0.1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
ζ = 0.2 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
ζ = 0.3 100 100 99.97 99.97 100 100 100 99.95 99.97 100 99.92
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respectively with PSNR values of 21.01  dB for LM, WM and RM respectively and 
25.09 dB for PM on Lena image. NC values are 77.29, 73.19, 73.53 and 95.92 respectively 
with PSNR value of 16.38 dB for LM, WM and RM and 29.29 dB for PM on Lena image 
for an angle of 3°. It clearly shows the superior performance for the rotation attack.
Median filter attack
Figure 8 shows the quality of the extracted watermark. NC values of LM, WM, RM and 
PM for the median filter attack for window size of 3 × 3 are 94.60, 94.99, 95.14 and 97.90 
respectively with PSNR value of 36.88  dB on Lena image. NC values are 92.62, 93.11, 
Table 4 continued
Attack Lena Mandrill Building Aptus Goldhill Zelda Airplane Barbara Tiffany Girl Brain
ζ = 0.4 99.56 99.53 99.65 99.43 99.82 99.82 99.78 99.65 99.87 99.92 99.65
ζ = 0.5 99.29 98.87 99.16 98.60 99.58 99.48 99.34 99.02 99.48 99.63 99.26
ζ = 0.6 98.85 98.21 98.70 97.68 99.41 99.38 99.09 98.41 99.36 99.36 98.73
Gaussian 
noise
V = .01 93.18 95.16 94.77 91.16 97.55 95.77 92.67 95.04 91.94 91.94 96.26
V = .02 91.18 93.89 93.21 89.37 96.82 93.56 90.94 93.75 89.33 88.96 95.31
V = .03 89.81 93.45 91.91 86.93 95.99 92.18 88.59 92.30 87.13 87.40 94.77
V = .04 88.47 92.40 91.82 86.79 95.45 91.11 87.54 91.91 86.27 87.40 93.67
V = .05 87.40 91.89 90.50 86.54 94.75 90.25 86.91 91.77 84.57 85.83 93.01
V = .06 87.08 90.79 90.01 85.67 93.87 89.96 86.32 91.13 84.49 84.93 92.67
V = .07 85.67 91.47 88.74 84.27 93.89 88.84 85.32 90.06 83.05 82.73 91.50
V = .08 85.13 90.33 87.91 84.54 93.96 87.45 84.27 90.11 82.91 82.15 91.33
V = .09 84.93 90.08 87.15 82.44 93.35 87.62 84.03 89.64 80.90 82.27 91.67
V = .10 84.30 89.47 86.86 81.86 92.72 87.81 84.15 89.16 81.20 82.22 90.99
Sharpening
α = .1 92.08 92.33 92.79 91.33 96.58 95.70 93.57 92.48 93.11 95.48 94.79
α = .2 92.28 92.40 93.04 91.62 96.53 95.72 93.70 92.74 93.11 95.41 94.72
α = .3 92.28 92.60 93.23 91.74 96.65 95.80 93.87 92.94 93.13 95.48 94.77
α = .4 92.40 92.79 93.21 91.79 96.60 95.70 93.94 93.13 93.16 95.53 94.94
α = .5 92.40 92.96 93.28 91.89 96.67 95.70 93.92 93.26 93.23 95.55 95.04
α = .6 92.40 92.99 93.31 92.08 96.72 95.80 93.92 93.40 93.31 95.65 95.09
α = .7 92.45 93.13 93.35 92.21 96.75 95.75 94.04 93.60 93.45 95.60 95.11
α = .8 92.48 93.21 93.38 92.16 96.67 95.82 94.09 93.65 93.43 95.65 95.09
α = .9 92.57 93.21 93.45 92.23 96.70 95.80 94.14 93.65 93.57 95.67 95.14
α = 1 92.67 93.33 93.55 92.26 96.75 95.77 94.16 93.65 93.53 95.70 95.10
Gamma 
correction
G = .6 97.60 96.80 97.24 97.46 97.29 95.99 99.16 97.02 99.12 98.75 93.33
G = .7 98.29 97.68 97.92 98.02 98.09 97.21 99.31 98.02 99.24 99.04 97.48
G = .8 98.87 98.36 98.51 98.75 98.75 98.02 99.48 98.65 99.53 99.19 98.36
G = .9 99.41 99.21 99.36 99.56 99.48 98.99 99.75 99.38 99.68 99.60 99.24
G = 1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
G = 1.1 99.07 99.31 99.21 99.41 99.43 98.99 99.68 99.36 99.78 99.63 99.29
G = 1.2 98.46 98.73 98.63 98.87 98.87 98.02 99.60 98.85 99.73 99.56 98.75
G = 1.3 98.02 97.97 97.99 98.29 98.43 97.38 99.31 97.94 99.43 99.34 98.09
G = 1.4 97.33 97.41 97.53 97.92 98.09 96.65 99.21 97.50 99.16 99.12 97.43
G = 1.5 96.94 96.99 96.89 97.11 97.87 96.02 98.82 96.94 98.92 99.07 96.87
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Q = 50 93.75 95.84 94.43 92.18 91.94 95.04 95.50 95.45 95.87 96.28 93.50 97.38
Q = 70 94.79 97.41 96.60 93.65 94.53 95.87 96.41 96.36 96.33 97.09 94.70 97.87
Q = 90 97.72 98.75 98.38 96.60 97.14 97.70 97.09 98.24 98.14 98.26 96.77 98.73
RO
A = 1° 79.78 79.19 80.46 79.98 81.49 83.96 84.93 79.29 84.79 79.54 79.12 84.61
A = 3° 77.29 78.32 78.83 78.54 77.95 78.63 77.39 73.19 73.16 73.31 69.75 75.10
A = 5° 79.37 77.73 78.63 78.34 77.46 78.41 73.19 67.04 68.60 70.50 67.43 70.41
MF
ws = 3 × 3 94.60 95.94 95.58 95.89 94.23 97.11 94.99 94.06 94.82 96.09 91.25 94.75
ws = 5 × 5 92.62 92.57 93.11 93.43 91.57 94.11 93.11 90.28 92.99 94.04 88.54 91.77
ws = 7 × 7 89.99 87.93 89.69 90.01 88.35 90.52 92.01 88.35 92.13 91.87 87.54 89.99
CR
%C = 20 95.53 94.45 94.84 95.31 95.62 95.01 87.52 80.88 79.49 72.72 63.62 83.66
%C = 40 90.77 90.62 90.16 91.08 91.45 91.18 83.44 78.44 77.90 72.70 61.23 82.15
%C = 60 87.32 86.32 86.10 86.74 86.69 86.96 80.00 73.53 72.72 70.06 72.97 77.41
SC
F = 2 × 2 96.70 97.75 96.92 95.99 96.33 97.29 94.79 92.94 94.65 94.43 91.16 94.31
F = 4 × 4 90.45 90.40 89.52 88.76 88.89 90.42 92.08 88.59 91.94 91.28 88.08 90.84
F = 6 × 6 83.52 84.35 83.66 83.08 83.49 84.98 90.50 85.76 90.03 88.84 87.06 87.86
IN
R = .05 84.91 86.49 85.79 84.35 83.32 96.70 80.22 79.49 79.32 79.10 76.90 94.53
R = .15 81.71 83.10 83.17 82.00 80.78 94.79 74.04 73.77 75.19 74.38 72.14 93.31
R = .25 80.27 82.34 81.25 81.03 80.46 91.74 71.14 70.26 70.99 71.24 70.31 90.89
BL
ζ = 0.2 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
ζ = 0.4 99.34 99.56 99.31 99.14 99.21 99.80 98.82 99.16 99.19 99.29 98.68 99.19
ζ = 0.6 98.14 98.75 98.43 98.14 97.97 99.12 96.77 96.46 96.67 97.26 95.33 97.19
GN
V = .01 84.57 87.59 85.96 84.25 83.66 89.28 84.42 84.91 85.15 82.71 78.93 92.60
V = .03 83.25 84.13 83.22 83.78 80.68 87.57 78.73 79.51 79.29 77.49 73.46 89.18
V = .05 82.93 83.83 81.90 82.03 80.90 86.76 74.53 76.34 75.75 75.09 72.09 87.89
SH
α = .1 95.19 95.67 95.99 95.33 94.99 96.41 86.05 87.15 86.81 89.74 84.35 89.52
α = .3 95.50 95.72 96.26 95.26 95.38 96.58 87.23 87.81 87.52 90.16 85.64 90.06
α = .5 95.28 95.87 96.41 95.53 95.58 96.75 87.84 88.01 87.67 90.60 86.27 90.23
GC
G = .8 99.56 99.29 99.12 99.02 99.16 99.38 98.92 97.53 98.16 99.21 98.92 97.65
G = 1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
G = 1.2 99.48 99.16 99.29 99.29 99.21 98.73 98.85 97.87 98.02 99.34 99.07 97.75
UA 90.81 91.30 91.10 90.62 90.28 93.02 88.35 86.68 87.44 87.08 84.16 90.89
RM PM
JP
Q = 50 96.11 95.31 95.92 96.31 94.14 96.63 98.04 98.77 99.46 97.97 98.43 98.90
Q = 70 96.48 96.75 96.67 96.97 94.89 97.43 98.73 99.09 99.48 98.87 98.65 99.12
Q = 90 97.72 97.92 97.65 98.14 96.80 98.58 99.31 99.63 99.73 99.34 99.38 99.63
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93.79 and 96.06 respectively with PSNR values of 34.34 for LM, WM, RM and PM on 
Lena image for window size of 5 × 5. It clearly shows the superior performance for the 
median filter attack.
Cropping attack
The performance of LM is better than the other methods for the cropping attack. How-




A = 1° 85.49 78.88 84.93 79.27 77.49 84.83 93.82 94.36 98.26 93.31 92.43 96.46
A = 3° 77.34 72.26 73.77 72.46 68.48 76.41 95.92 95.58 98.21 95.80 95.67 96.41
A = 5° 73.53 66.62 69.92 70.21 66.47 70.31 95.89 95.62 97.97 95.87 95.77 96.85
MF
ws = 3 × 3 95.14 93.75 94.99 96.38 91.62 94.97 97.90 97.77 99.12 98.73 97.43 98.09
ws = 5 × 5 93.79 90.57 92.99 94.21 88.79 92.30 96.06 95.23 98.51 97.24 96.31 96.14
ws = 7 × 7 92.79 88.89 91.87 92.50 87.25 90.42 94.84 93.89 98.07 95.77 95.62 94.70
CR
%C = 20 84.81 79.41 78.14 72.43 64.74 83.10 82.61 83.76 89.69 73.33 79.10 87.79
%C = 40 84.20 79.24 80.49 74.58 62.67 85.18 78.97 74.68 80.54 71.92 76.26 81.32
%C = 60 78.63 72.80 71.77 68.60 70.09 75.34 73.33 69.14 72.80 72.85 74.90 75.48
SC
F = 2 × 2 95.04 92.55 94.67 94.48 91.74 94.26 97.85 97.80 99.09 98.41 97.92 98.07
F = 4 × 4 92.77 88.23 92.11 90.91 88.79 90.60 94.89 93.79 97.58 95.28 95.89 95.14
F = 6 × 6 91.08 85.40 90.42 88.67 86.96 88.57 93.55 92.18 96.58 93.28 94.75 93.26
IN
R = .05 82.25 81.05 82.78 79.00 76.53 94.92 97.72 97.75 95.55 98.75 97.38 97.80
R = .15 75.36 76.00 76.17 73.65 72.90 93.67 97.07 96.85 94.45 98.33 96.77 97.16
R = .25 72.09 72.38 72.41 70.89 69.77 91.47 95.43 95.23 92.26 96.75 94.84 96.24
BL
ζ = 0.2 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
ζ = 0.4 99.19 99.19 99.26 99.41 98.97 99.02 99.56 99.65 99.82 99.78 99.87 99.65
ζ = 0.6 96.89 96.36 96.92 97.43 95.72 96.80 98.85 98.70 99.41 99.09 99.36 98.73
GN
V = .01 83.74 84.91 85.64 83.20 77.90 92.30 93.18 94.77 97.55 92.67 91.94 96.26
V = .03 77.61 78.78 79.02 76.63 73.02 89.91 89.81 91.91 95.99 88.59 87.13 94.77
V = .05 75.56 76.12 77.51 76.02 71.87 87.40 87.40 90.50 94.75 86.91 84.57 93.01
SH
α = .1 86.88 88.03 87.37 89.06 84.17 90.45 92.08 92.79 96.58 93.57 93.11 94.79
α = .3 87.74 88.40 87.79 89.79 85.74 91.04 92.28 93.23 96.65 93.87 93.13 94.77
α = .5 88.69 88.62 88.13 90.35 86.79 90.89 92.40 93.28 96.67 93.92 93.23 95.04
GC
G = .8 99.21 98.21 98.46 99.26 98.90 97.80 98.87 98.51 98.75 99.48 99.53 98.36
G = 1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
G = 1.2 99.29 98.36 98.60 99.36 99.09 98.16 98.46 98.63 98.87 99.60 99.73 98.75
UA 88.64 86.83 87.87 87.00 84.07 91.09 94.16 94.10 96.07 93.97 93.97 95.42
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Scaling attack
NC values of LM, WM, RM and PM for the scaling attack for scale factors of 2 ×  2 
and 6 × 6 are 96.70, 94.79, 95.04, 98.07 respectively, and 83.52, 90.50, 91.08 and 93.26 
respectively with PSNR values 32.99 dB and 26.65 dB. It clearly shows the superior per-
formance for the scaling attack.
Impulse noise attack
Figure 8 shows the quality of the extracted watermark. NC values of LM, WM, RM and 
PM for impulse noise attack for impulse noise ratio of 0.05 are 84.91, 80.22, 82.25 and 
Fig. 5 Comparison of different methods: a JPEG compression, b Rotation, c Median filter, d Cropping, e Scal-
ing, f Impulse noise
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97.80 respectively with PSNR values of 23.34 dB for LM, WM and RM and 36.42 dB for 
PM, and for impulse noise ratio of 0.15 are 81.71, 74.04, 75.36 and 97.16 respectively with 
PSNR values of 18.60 dB for LM, WM and RM and 34.81 dB for PM. It clearly shows the 
better performance of the proposed method for impulse noise attack. The better perfor-
mance of PM is due to inbuilt restoration scheme against the impulse noise attack.
Blurring attack
Figure  8 shows the quality of the extracted watermark. LM, WM, RM and PM give 
very good performance for blurring attack, and the detected secret images are also not 
blurred.
Fig. 6 Comparison of different methods:  a Gaussian noise, b Blurring, c Sharpening and d Gamma correc-
tion attacks
Fig. 7 No attack: a Original watermark, b Encrypted watermark, c Ownership share, d Identification share, e 
Superimposed share, f Superimposed share after reduction and g Extracted watermark
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Gaussian noise attack
Figure 8 shows the quality of the extracted watermark. NC values of LM, WM, RM and 
PM for the Guassian noise attack for zero mean and variance of 0.01 are 84.57, 84.42, 
83.74 and 96.26 respectively with PSNR values of 24.77 dB for LM, WM and RM and 
30.89 dB for PM, and for variance of 0.03 are 82.93, 74.53, 75.56 and 94.77 respectively 
with PSNR values of 20.21  dB for LM, WM and RM and 27.08  dB for PM. It clearly 
shows the better performance of the proposed method for Gaussian noise attack. The 
better performance of PM is due to inbuilt restoration scheme against the Gaussian 
noise attack.
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Fig. 8 Detected watermarks by various methods
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Sharpening attack
Figure 8 shows the quality of the extracted watermark. LM shows better performance in 
comparison with WM, RM and PM for sharpening attack.
Gamma correction attack
For gamma correction attack, all LM, WM, RM and PM give good performance.
False positive detection problem arises in most of the SVD and VC-based algorithms. 
Methods proposed by Lou et al. (2007), Rawat and Raman (2012) and Wang and Chen 
(2007) suffer from this problem. An unauthorized image can be used to extract or detect 
the watermark producing the watermark, though the quality is not good. This means 
that anyone who can detect watermark can claim ownership. Our method solves this 
false claim by encrypting the watermark prior to the ownership share generation, and it 
decrypts at the time of detection.
Robustness against the rotation attack
Table 6 gives the NCs and errors in detection for the rotation angles from 5° to 85° on Lena 
and Mandrill images. It shows that the NC values of the proposed algorithm for both images 
lie above 93.67 and below 95. Errors in detection for the rotation angles are comparatively 
low. The minimum error in magnitude is 0.20 % and the maximum error in magnitude is 
3.02 %. It shows that the proposed method is very effective to handle the rotation attack.
Conclusions
The paper describes a new watermarking algorithm based on the shuffled singular value 
decomposition and the visual cryptography for copyright protection of digital images 
in the DWT domain. The robustness of the proposed method was verified on different 
types of images for different attacks. Comparison with the other related VC-based algo-
rithms reveals that the proposed method gives better performance.
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